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ENCOURAGING INDUSTRY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE
NON-COMMERCIAL PROPERTY
KATHERINE X. VASILIADESt

I.

INTRODUCTION

At one time, American cities represented opportunity and
grandeur, offering great expectations and a high standard of living.
With the growth of industrialization and the declining likelihood of
success in rural agricultural America, people migrated to cities for
jobs and prosperity. However, advancements in science and technology led to rapid industrialization which produced harmful effects upon society, the environment and human health.1 After
much debate and controversy, federal 2 and state 3 legislatures enacted environmental statutes in an effort to combat these harmful
effects.
Initially, the debate concerning environmental legislation
could be characterized as a partisan political battle between environmental conservation and economic development. More recently, proponents of these two positions have adopted a more
synergistic view of environmental and economic concerns. 4 Nonetheless, despite efforts to work together, the current statutory
t Katherine X. Vasiliades is a member of staff counsel for The Prudential Insurance Company of America, handling litigation and arbitration matters arising
from claims filed pursuant to property and casualty policies written by Prudential.
The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author only, and not of The
Prudential Insurance Company of America. This Article is written in memory of
Irene Doumas Vasiliades and Katherine Chrysohos Janulis, and with deep gratitude for the support of parents, family and friends, as well as John Copeland Nagle, Esq., for his advice and guidance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Discovery of the ill effects of environmental contamination upon human
health and welfare influenced the drafting of environmental regulations, as indicated in the National Environmental Policy Act. See National Environmental Policy
Act § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]; Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994)) [hereinafter RCRA].
3. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K (West 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746
(Anderson 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020 (West 1993).
4. See Superfund: House Leaders Support Bipartisan Effort on Brownfields, Other
CERCLA Reform Issues, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2036 (Feb. 23, 1996).
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scheme is in desperate need of reexamination. 5 It is clear that a
resolution requires the prevention of both economic stagnation
and widespread contamination of the environment.
Federal environmental statutes, particularly the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), impose comprehensive and far-reaching liability for the
contamination of land and mandate remediation. In doing so,
CERCLA reflects salutary goals and forces current and potential
polluters to reexamine their actions. However, because of the potentially staggering costs of remediation, critics claim that CERC[A
inhibits potential purchasers and lenders from investing in property previously used for industrial purposes. 6
Consequently, industry is migrating from the prior bulwark of
prosperity to undeveloped land in suburban and rural areas, leaving behind wastelands of contaminated property and unemployment.7

Recognizing

the

needs

to

encourage

environmental

consciousness, preserve biodiversity and foster economic growth,
state and federal legislatures have proposed legislation to revitalize
cities and discourage the destruction of uncontaminated land.
This Article examines CERCLA's current liability scheme,
which has resulted in the abandonment of contaminated industrial
property (brownfields) for relatively pristine rural and suburban
property (greenfields), and the responses of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state governments. Sec5. See Superfund: Meetings Continue on GOP Reform Bill; Little Progress Seen on
Disputed Issues, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2069 (Mar. 1, 1996).
6. See Debra L. Baker & Lance L. Shea, How to Avoid EnvironmentalLiability in
Business Transactions,43 Sw. L.J. 957 (1990) (admonishing businesses to be prudent in transactions due to enormous liability attendant to acquisition of real estate in corporate mergers); see also International Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Stevens, 710
F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that sellers who insert "as is" clauses
which purport to absolve them from future environmental liability are not necessarily protected from CERCLA claims).
7. See Douglas A. McWilliams, EnvironmentalJustice and IndustrialRedevelopment
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 717 (1994)
(stressing that urban redevelopment advocates lobby for fewer environmental impediments to reuse of formerly industrial urban property). Urban redevelopment
advocates run the gamut from state officials to economic development experts who
are entrusted with the economic rebirth of urban areas. More lawyers and business leaders have become a part of this group in order to alleviate their frustration
with the inefficiency and cost of environmental cleanup at abandoned industrial
sites. As a result, urban redevelopment advocates have experienced few problems
in persuading state legislators to favor clearing the way for urban revitalization.
See, e.g., Patrick von Keyserling, Legislation Encourages Redevelopment of Industrial
Land, CENT. PA. Bus.J., Oct. 20, 1993, at 6 (stating that both Industrial Land Reuse
Act and Economic Development Agency Environmental Liability Protection Act
passed unanimously through Pennsylvania Legislature).
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tion II of this Article discusses CERCLA, a far-reaching statute
which was designed to remedy threats to human health and the
destruction of resources resulting from unfettered environmental
contamination. Section III addresses the problematic effects of
CERCLA. This section also discusses the influence of political
agendas on CERCLA reform and illustrates that CERCLA must be
modified in order to be effective. Section IV discusses the impact
of lender liability on the development of brownfields. Section V
examines federal and state lawmakers' recognition of the desperate
condition of CERCLA as well as the urgent need to revive previously used commercial property. Finally, Section VI summarizes
the brownfields dilemma and offers recommendations for reform.
II.

AN

OVERVIEW

OF CERCLA

Enacted in 1980 shortly after the Love Canal disaster, and on
the eve of a new republican Senate and the close of the Carter administration, 8 CERCLA9 is the primary federal statute regulating
the brownfields/greenfields problem.1 0 CERCLA, however, is a
"hastily patched together promise Act" which contains ambiguous
standards and provides a fertile field for litigation. 1
8. See Michael Parrish, Occidental Agrees to Pay $98 Million in Love Canal Case
Environment: In a Key Civil Lawsuit over Buried Toxic Waste, the Company Will Also Take
over the Clean-up Effort, L.A. TIMEs, June 22, 1994, at 1. Love Canal was a residential
community in Niagara Falls, New York. As a result of the discovery of toxic substances seeping into homes, the entire town was evacuated in 1978. See id.
9. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).
10. Two alternative liability schemes were presented to Congress. One was
presented to the House of Representatives and one to the Senate. The House bill
imposed liability on parties who "caused or contributed" to hazardous waste
problems. Conversely, liability under the Senate bill attached to specific "responsible parties." See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation and Responsibility, 78
MiNN. L. REv. 1493, 1493-94 (1994). The version of CERCLA passed was the bill
sponsored by the Senate and it constituted a last minute compromise.
11. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986). In Maryland Bank, the United States brought an action against Maryland Bank (the bank) to recover expenses sustained by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the removal of hazardous waste at a toxic dump site owned
by the bank. See id. The issue concerned whether the bank was liable for these
expenses when the hazardous waste was dumped on the property prior to the
bank's ownership of it. See id. at 574. Thus, the court focused its inquiry on
whether the bank was an "owner and operator" of the property within the meaning
of sections 107(a) (1) and 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA. See id. at 577. The bank argued
an affirmative defense based upon section 107(b) (3), asserting that the hazardous
waste was the result of a third party other than the defendant. See id.
The court found that the bank was an undisputed owner of the property since
1982, before the waste was discovered. See id. The court also found the parties'
dispute over the term "operator" was not determinative, since current ownership
of a facility alone brings a party within the ambit of subsection (1). See id. Thus,
the court concluded that CERCLA imposes strict liability on the present owner of a
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Unlike the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 12 a regulatory statute passed in 1976, CERCIA is primarily
a remedial statute which responds to a "release or substantial threat
of release" of harmful substances, 13 and finances cleanup through a
facility from which there is a release or a threat of release, notwithstanding an
absence of causation. See id. at 578.
The court ordered a full trial to resolve the issue of the bank's third party
defense since genuine issues of fact remained after the court scrutinized the evidence concerning the propriety of the contractual relation between the bank and
the property's former owner and the reasonableness of the bank's conduct. See id.
at 581. In the end, the court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment pertaining to the issue of liability under section 107(a) (1) and denied that
part of the motion concerning the third party defense under section 107(b) (3).
See id.
12. See RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903. Section 1004 of RCRA provides the
definitional section. See id. It states in pertinent part:
(3) The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into
or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
(5) The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of
solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristics may (A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness;
or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health
or the environment when properly treated, stored, transported, or
disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.
13. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Section 107 of CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defense set forth in subsection (b) of this section(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
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trust fund called the "Superfund." 14 Under CERCLA, EPA may
either issue an order compelling the cleanup of a site or utilize the
Superfund to clean up a site 15 and seek recovery from potentially
responsible parties (PRPs).16 CERCLA aims to protect human
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
14. See id. § 111 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a). Section 111 (a) of CERCLA provides
in relevant part:
For the purposes specified in this section there is authorized to be appropriated from the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of title 26 not more than $8,500,000,000 for the
5-year period beginning on October 17, 1986, and not more than
$5,100,000,000 for the period commencing October 1, 1991, and ending
September 30, 1994, and such sums shall remain available until expended. The preceding sentence constitutes a specific authorization for
the funds appropriated under title II of Public Law 99-160 (relating to
payment to the Hazardous Substances Trust Fund). The President shall
use the money in the fund for the following purposes:
(1) Payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to
section 9604 of this title, including costs incurred pursuant to the
Intervention on the High Seas Act [33 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.].
(2) Payment of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by
any other person as a result of carrying out the national contingency
plan established under section 1321 (c) of title
33 and amended by
section 9605 of this title: Provided, however, That such costs must be
approved under said plan and certified by the responsible Federal
official.
Id.
15. See id. § 111(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(1). Section 111(b) of CERCLA
provides:
Claims asserted and compensable but unsatisfied under provisions of section 1321 of title 33, which are modified by section 304 of this Act may be
asserted against the Fund under this subchapter; and other claims resulting from a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance from a
vessel or a facility may be asserted against the Fund under this subchapter
for injury to, or destruction or loss of, natural resources, including cost
for damage assessment: Provided, however, That any such claim may be asserted only by the President, as trustee, for natural resources over which
the United States has sovereign rights, or natural resources within the
territory or the fishery conservation zone of the United States to the extent they are managed or protected by the United States, or by any State
for natural resources within the boundary of That State belonged to,
managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such tribe, or held in trust
for the benefit of such tribe, or belonging to a member of such tribe if
such resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation.
Id.
16. See id. § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). Section 106(b) of CERCLA provides
in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or
refuses to comply with, any order of the President under subsection (a) of
this section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States
district court to enforce such order, be fined not more than $25,000 for
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health and welfare by preventing contamination and by removing
and remediating pollution which has already occurred. 17
In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) to address statutory ambiguities which
had become apparent shortly after the enactment of CERCLA.18
SARA provides standards, known as Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements, designed to clarify the required level of
cleanup under CERCLA. 19 The standards, however, have merely
added to the complex web of environmental regulation.
The ambiguities of CERCLA's statutory language have resulted
in extensive judicial interpretation concerning the scope and apportionment of liability. 20 In fact, CERCLA's "liability standard"
each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply
continues.
(2) (A) Any person who receives and complies with the terms of any order issued under subsection (a) of this section may, within 60 days after
completion of the required action, petition the President for reimbursement from the Fund for the reasonable costs of such action, plus interest.
Any interest payable under this paragraph shall accrue on the amounts
expended from the date of expenditure at the same rate as specified for
interest on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of title 26.
Id.
17. See id. §§ 104-06, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-06. Although CERC[A is not characteristically a regulatory statute, it prevents contamination through its remediation
charges and scope of liability.
18. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 960175 (1994)).
19. See CERCLA § 121 (d) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1). This section provides
in pertinent part:
Remedial actions selected under this section or otherwise required or
agreed to by the President under this chapter shall attain a degree of
cleanup of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants released
into the environment and of control of further release at a minimum
which assures protection of human health and the environment. Such
remedial actions shall be relevant and appropriate under the circumstances presented by the release or threatened release of such substance,
pollutant, or contaminant.
Id.
20. See Daniel Michel, The CERCLA Paradoxand Ohio's Response to the Brownfield
Problem: Senate Bill 221, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 435, 439 (1995) (concluding that Ohio
has taken necessary legislative step towards ameliorating brownfield problem).
Shortly after Ohio enacted legislation to respond to the ambiguities of CERCLA,
Ohio Governor George Voinovich traveled to various abandoned industrial sites
throughout the state in an effort to improve the bill's future impact on the
brownfields problem. See E.B. Boyd, Montgomery Lauds Brownfields Bill's PassageBut
Admits Error,TOLEDO BLADE, June 30, 1994, at 19. However, less than eight months
later when the City of Toledo offered one of the sites to the State of Ohio as a
potential prison site, Governor Voinovich responded, "[i]f [the abandoned site
experiences] big [environmental] problems, let me tell you straight out: They had
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has been derived through interpretation by the federal courts. Specifically, although it does not expressly provide a measure of liability, federal courts have interpreted CERCLA as including a strict
21
liability standard.
Pursuant to CERCLA, liability is imposed upon four categories
of PRPs: (1) current owners and operators; (2) past owners and
operators; (3) generators (those who arranged for disposal) 22 ; and
(4) transporters. 23 The inclusion of prior owners as PRPs is especially controversial because it results in retroactive liability for previously acceptable behavior. 24 Moreover, holding current owners
responsible allows liability to result not because of past action, but
simply due to one's status. 25 As a result, the disincentive to
26
purchase property previously used for industrial purposes is clear.
Another disincentive is the possibility that lenders fear liability derived from a mortgage or security interest because the term "current owner" is not specifically defined in CERCLA. 27 Although
better find another site in the community." David Jacobs & Robin Erb, Is Prison
Plan Poisoned? Get East Toledo Site Tested, Voinovich Warns, TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 2,
1995, at 1.
21. See Michel, supra note 20, at 440.
22. Compare Nurad v. Hooper, 966 F.2d 837, 844-847 (4th Cir. 1992) (determining that "disposal" is satisfied by natural movement) with United States v.
CDMG Realty Co., 875 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (D.NJ. 1995) (finding that "disposal"
must be limited to its active meaning) and United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel,
Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Ill. 1992) (concluding that "passive" disposal does
not trigger liability).
23. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. This section provides in pertinent
part that the following are held liable under CERCLA:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances ....
Id.
24. See id. In 1989, the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that retroactive
liability violated the due process clause, finding that the defendant had not shown
arbitrary or irrational action by Congress. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988).
25. Causation was a consideration in the bill proposed by the House, but not
in the Senate bill, which was ultimately adopted. See Nagle, supra note 10, at 149394.
26. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
27. See Sara A. Goldberg, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Shaping a New Legal
Rule, 4 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 61, 62-64 (1995) (asserting that new rule for lender liability should focus on benefits of lender-borrower relationship).
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Congress attempted to address lenders' fears by including a "security interest exemption" in CERCLA, this exemption has produced
28
inconsistent results in federal courts.
The apportionment of liability under CERCLA is also ambiguous. Federal courts, when faced with this issue, have generally applied common law principles. 29 In doing so, courts have held
parties jointly and severally liable.3 0 The imposition of joint and
several liability arguably accomplishes the goals of deterrence, compensation and accountability. On the other hand, the enormous
costs of remediation and removal, and the uncertain cleanup standard have deterred potential purchasers from considering urban
sites previously used for industrial purposes. Purchasers have generally not been willing to enter into a transaction in which they are
confronted with potential liability, obligated to absolve themselves
to the greatest extent possible, and faced with the problem of trying
to secure indemnification or contribution from other PRPs.
28. See id. at 65. One commentator argued that CERCLA expressly makes
apparent that mortgagees are immune from pre-foreclosure liability under CERCLA's secured creditor exemption. See id. For instance, Congress's definition of
"owner or operator" clearly excludes "a person who, without participating in the
management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the ...

facility." Id.

However, several judicial decisions have addressed the possibility that banks
with security interests in realty may be held responsible for cleanup costs. See id.
Further, cases have also indicated that banks which foreclose on collateral may also
be held liable. See id. "[T] his uncertain status in the law has had significant negative effects on the availability of credit, the environment, and the economy as a
whole." Id.
29. See United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
In Chem-Dyne, the federal government instituted an action against several companies to recover expenses for the cleanup of hazardous waste generated by the companies at a treatment facility. See id. Since this was an issue of first impression for
the court, it focused on the basis and content of the rule which it formulated to
address this question. See id.
The court first noted that the scope of liability under section 107 of CERCLA
is to be determined by evolving principles of federal common law. See id. at 808.
The court next determined that "an examination of the common law reveals that
when two or more persons acting independently caused a distinct or single harm
for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of
each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has
himself caused." Id. at 810.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965). The current standard

of liability is enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 433A and
433B, which provide that each party is responsible for a pro rata share of divisible
harm, but is subject to complete liability for single and indivisible harm. See id.
Prior to the adoption of this standard, apportionment of liability was accomplished
consistent with the standard in Summers v. Tice. See generally 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
Under the court's holding in Summers, when a plaintiff sustained damage due to
the negligence of more than one defendant but was unable to apportion liability,
each defendant had the burden of producing evidence to negate liability; otherwise, the defendant was held liable for the entire harm. See id.
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and private parties to recover cleanup costs. Under section 104 of
CERCLA, the government may clean up the site using Superfund
resources and seek to recover costs incurred if the expenses are
"not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP). '"31
EPA is also authorized to issue an order to PRPs compelling the
cleanup of the site.3 2 Failure to comply with the order may result in
penalties of up to $25,000.00 per day and the imposition of treble
33
damages.
Under CERCLA, private parties may seek cost recovery or contribution. If cleanup is shown to be consistent with the NCP, a
party originally compelled to perform a cleanup may recover all or
part of the cost from other PRPs.3 4 In contrast, EPA may recover
unless action is shown to be inconsistent with the NCP. Thus, when
private parties seek contribution, they have an affirmative burden
to show compliance with the NCP. In addition, a PRP may also seek
contribution for cleanup costs incurred pursuant to section 107 (recovery of costs by EPA) or section 106 (order compelling
cleanup). 35 Recoverable damages include not only pecuniary ex31. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). The National
Contingency Plan (NCP) is a set of procedures for the ranking of sites by level of

contamination and urgency, specifying the steps to be taken for cleanup. See id.

32. See id. § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). For the relevant language of this
section, see supra note 16.
33. See id. § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). This section states:

If any person who is liable for a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or
remedial action upon order of the President, pursuant to section 9604 or
9606 of this title, such person may be held liable to the United States for
punitive damages in an amount at least equal to, and not more than
three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of
such failure to take proper action. The President is authorized to commence a civil action against any such person to recover the punitive damages, which shall be in addition to any costs recovered from such person
pursuant to section 9612(c) of this tile. Any moneys received by the
United States pursuant to this subsection shall be deposited in the Fund.

Id.
34. See id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). For the relevant language of this section, see supra note 13.
35. See id. § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). This section provides in pertinent part:

Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this tide, during or following
or under section 9607(a)
any civil action under section 9606 of this title
of this tide. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Fed-

eral law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right
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penses, but also expenses and natural resource damages caused by
3 6

the release.

CERCLA provides few defenses to this broad-based scheme of
liability. Under section 107(b) (1) & (2), a party is absolved of liability if a release is caused by an act of God or an act of war.3

7

Addi-

tionally, pursuant to section 107(j), releases permitted under other
federal environmental statutes do not result in liability under CERCLA.3

8

More difficult issues arise in the context of the third party

defense, the innocent landowner defense and indemnification
agreements.
The third party defense, under section 107(b) (3), does not apply if a direct or indirect contractual relationship exists between the
PRP and the third party. Moreover, the third party defense requires that the PRP establish that he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances and that he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party and the consequences that could result from such acts or omissions.3 9 The inof any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil
action under 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
Id.

36. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C). Natural resource damages, recoverable by federal, state or tribal governments, include the
loss of wildlife and other types of natural resources which sustained damages as a
result of the release. See id.
37. See id. § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). This section provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war ....
Id.
38. See id. § 107(j), 42 U.S.C. § 96070). This section states:
Recovery by any person (including the United States or any State or Indian tribe) for response costs or damages resulting from a federally permitted release shall be pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section.
Nothing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liability of any person under any other provisions of State or Federal law, including common law, for damages, injury, or loss resulting
from a release of any hazardous substance or for removal or remedial
action or the costs of removal or remedial action of such hazardous substance. In addition, costs of response incurred by the Federal Government in connection with a discharge specified in section 9601(10) (B) or
(C) of this title shall be recoverable in an action brought under section
1319(b) of title 33.
Id.
39. See id. § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3). This section states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
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nocent landowner defense provided in section 101 (35) (A) is only
applicable if the landowner can demonstrate lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of hazardous substances after
40
undertaking "appropriate inquiry" upon purchasing the property.
Indemnification agreements are possibly the most effective tools
currently available to purchasers of property. Although section
107(e) prohibits avoidance of liability through contract, courts have
41
interpreted this section to permit indemnification agreements.
Unfortunately, it appears that CERCLA is unable to fulfill its
goals of promoting human health and welfare and responding to
the destruction of valuable resources as effectively as it could.
Notwithstanding the significant and laudable goals it was contemplated to achieve, this hurriedly drafted statute is in desperate need
of reform. Its expansive reach and costly application, designed to
wage full-scale war against environmental contamination, now
serves as an obstacle to its goals. The ambiguity in construction and
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant (except where the sole contractual relationship arises
from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier
by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts
or omissions ....
Id.
40. See id. § 101 (35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). This section states in pertinent part:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in
clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must
have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into
the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For
purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account any
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
Id.
41. See Lisl E. Miller, Indemnification Agreements Under CERCLA, 23 ENVTL. L.
333, 334 (1993) (concluding that majority view upholding and enforcing indemnification clauses in cases involving liability under CERCLA should continue in light
of ambiguous legislative history).
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application, the indeterminate standards of cleanup, along with the
breadth of liability, limits CERCLA's effectiveness. As it now stands,
CERCLA may inhibit remediation of contaminated sites, thus exacerbating the current status of environmental contamination and
prompting industry to encroach upon land which has not been previously put to industrial use.
III.

CERCLA'S

IMPLICATIONS ON BROWNFIELDS

Many American cities are facing a threat to their viability and
vitality as a result of CERCIA's liability net. Fearful of triggering
liability as current owners and faced with the prospect of attempting to secure financing from reluctant lenders, developers and industrial companies are opting for previously vacant land in
suburban or rural areas. 42 The result is not only the contamination
of new sites, but the loss of jobs and revenue at previously used
industrial sites.4 3 In addition, precious suburban and rural land is
falling prey to the development of industry and infrastructure.
Generally, the roadways, public transportation network and
public utility scheme in previously undeveloped areas, or "greenfields," must be redesigned because they were initially built to accommodate a more moderate use. 44 Although this redesign causes
a strain on the budget of suburban or rural municipalities, it is a
more calculable expense than the potentially enormous and indefinite cost of remediation under CERCLA's liability scheme. The
abandonment of industrial sites leaves behind vacant and contaminated wastelands and fosters a commuter work force, which increases air pollution.
In place of the once vital areas lie "brownfields," contaminated
property which serves as a reminder of potential disease and evidence of environmental contamination and demarcation of a less
42. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 72-73. Fear of lender liability has a restrictive effect on real estate transactions in areas designated as Superfund sites. See id.
For instance, a neighborhood located in Tucson, Arizona developed lending
problems attendant to its labeling as a Superfund site. Specifically residential,
commercial and industrial borrowers were unable to secure loans. See id.
43. See id. Moreover, the credit crunch has also proved deleterious to the
environment. See id. Liability concerns have deterred investment in previously
used, contaminated industrial sites called "brownfields." See id. Reluctance by
banks to become involved with properties with potential liability impedes ability to
restore such areas. See id.
44. See McWilliams, supra note 7, at 720. Government regulations do not require industries to assume any pre-development responsibility for the potential
contamination of greenfields. See id. As a result, federal, state and local taxpayers
assist the environmentally suspect spread of industrial development to greenfields
sites. See id.
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desirable place to live. 45 Clearly, an area already proven or suspected of being infected with toxins will not be attractive to potential residents, leaving those with lower income to bear a large share
of environmental risk.4 6 Reduction in property values may serve as
an added disincentive to undertake costly remediation of urban
sites.

47

Development of new commercial areas in cities is not the only
type of construction inhibited by the current liability scheme. Modernization and redevelopment of current commercial facilities are
also hindered by the potentially enormous costs of cleanup and the
reluctance of lenders to finance such ventures. Moreover, the redevelopment or expansion of an existing commercial site presents a
greater risk of liability than financing the development of previously non-commercial property. The risk of previously non-commercial sites is limited to the investment made, while existing
commercial sites are subject to CERCLA's indeterminate environmental liability. 4 8 Assuming CERCLA's strict liability is imposed,

expensive cleanup costs may compromise the borrower's ability to
pay off debt, leaving the lender with the option to foreclose upon a
contaminated piece of property.4 9 Therefore, lenders may view ex-

45. See id. at 712. Few urban communities have the resources to follow their
own redevelopment plans without soliciting sources from public and private
sources employed by industrial redevelopment advocates. See id. Consequently,
communities which strongly emphasize economic development will likely benefit
from outside resources provided by redevelopment advocates. See id.
46. See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shiing Risks
of Acquiring and Reusing ContaminatedLand, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 789, 801 (1995). Advocates of environmental justice have asserted that brownfield sites are deliberately
placed in low income communities, adding to the discrimination present in such
areas. See id. In addition, differential cleanup standards, which may promote investment, may be characterized as an aggravating factor. See id.
47. See id. Flexibility in determining appropriate levels of cleanup generally
precipitate sensitive environmental equity issues. See id. Further, the strong concern for environmental equity "is the wild card in any effort to cut the cost of
remediating contaminated land - either by tailoring the scope of the cleanup to a
specific use, or by ...

restrictive use covenants .

. . ."

Id.

48. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 63. In routine lending transactions, financial institutions typically incur substantial risks. Generally, however, in the absence
of Superfund liability, the most a lender stands to lose is the amount of the investment. For example, a financial institution that secures a loan with real estate accepts both the risk of a reduction in the value of the collateral due to
environmental problems and the risk that the borrower will be unable to pay for
necessary cleanup. Consequently, these risks diminish the value of the bank's investment and increase the risk that its lien will be subordinated to a superior lien
imposed by the government.
49. See Hank Schilling, Clarity, Predictability and Simplicity, 12 ENvrL. FORUM
(Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 3, at 28 (May-June 1995).
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isting commercial sites as providing inadequate collateral due to
the threat of environmental liability.
The brownfields dilemma also illustrates the often differing
agendas of environmentalists and developers and creates a political
minefield of potentially explosive issues. Developers seek opportunities for capital gain. While environmental advocates seek assessment and remediation of property, developers are inhibited by
ambiguous and often conflicting state and federal environmental
statutes. 50 In short, developers desire flexibility in the costs and
standards of removal and remediation, and regulatory predictability. 5 1 These two factors, however, are unlikely to coexist without
tension.
Standing in opposition to those advancing the interests of industrial and economic development are those whose primary concern is environmental conservation and remediation. These two
opposing interests meet in the political arena, and each hopes to
affect statutory liability. Specifically, republicans traditionally promote the advancement of industry, favoring fewer or more lenient
government imposed environmental regulations. In contrast, democrats advocate a more strict and more pervasive governmental regulatory scheme.
Today, neither interest group is content, and each fiercely
fights against the other to advance its goals. This unrelenting tug of
war can only yield a Pyrrhic victory, leaving the environment and
society as its casualties. Fewer or less stringent standards may facilitate industrial advancement, but will not aid the remediation of
contaminated property. Moreover, this type of regulatory scheme
adds to the problems of discrimination, disease and decreased
property values. Conversely, stringent and pervasive regulations
compel developers to develop previously non-industrial sites. This
results in expansion of environmental contamination, loss of species upon which biodiversity depends, loss of revenue and employment opportunity, and decline in property values.
It is clear that statutory reform is imperative. Compromises
should not be perceived as political suicide or a sacrifice of ideals.
Instead, compromise should be viewed as necessary to a political
solution. The task to be completed is imposing, but a regulatory
50. SeeJohn C. Wise, Brownfields: Recycling Contaminated Urban Land, LAND
AND ENvTL. FORUM,

USE

Summer 1995, at 141.

51. See id. at 142. Developers and lenders consider regulatory requirements
and the remediation process in making determinations regarding risks of potential
investments. See id. Ambiguity creates difficulties in assessing risks, and diminishes
the certainty and predictability of remedial costs and regulatory standards. See id.
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scheme must be structured in such a way as to encourage developers to consider purchasing abandoned sites and lenders to finance
such development. However, the regulatory scheme must concurrently provide for remediation of contaminated property in order
to avoid creating an enormous wasteland that threatens human
health and welfare. Moreover, this reform must occur simultaneously on the state and federal level with regulations operating in
tandem.
IV.

ACQUIRING LIABILIry

The potential liability of lenders and developers under CERCIA as current owners or operators of property presents a large
stumbling block for the redevelopment of brownfields.5 2 The fear
of the risk of strict, joint and several liability is a major considera53
tion contemplated by lenders prior to financing redevelopment.
Not only may lenders be held liable as current owners, but cleanup
costs may threaten the financial stability of a borrower. This
presents the possible result of a borrower's insolvency, leaving the
lender with devalued collateral. 54 The issue of lender liability
under CERCLA as interpreted by federal courts is one of the significant issues addressed by legislators attempting to resolve the
brownfields/greenfields problem.
Several vague and controversial aspects of CERCLA have been
interpreted by federal courts. For example, CERCLA does not
specify the standard of liability to be imposed upon PRPs. Judicial
interpretation, however, has resulted in the imposition of strict liability.5 5 Despite the lack of express articulation of such a standard,
52. See William Keener, Brownfields: The United States EPA's Policy and Legal Response, LAND USE AND ENVTL. FORUM, Summer 1995, at 143.

53. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 63, 69-71. Financial institutions now risk
liability greater than their investment in light of CERCLA's "wide net of liability."
Id. at 63. Further, if the mortgaged property is contaminated, the lender's security
interest is jeopardized, and the lender may be held responsible for both cleanup
costs and natural resource damages. See id.
54. See McWilliams, supra note 7, at 728-29; see also Goldberg, supra note 27, at
62-65. The risks in routine lending transactions are essentially limited to the
amount of institution's investment, while transactions involving contaminated
property present additional risks, such as reduction in value and threat to the financial stability of the borrower. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 63.
55. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
In Shore Realty Corp., the State of New York brought an action against Shore Realty
Corporation and Donald LeoGrande, its officer and stockholder, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking an order for
Shore Realty to clean up a hazardous waste disposal site, which it owned. See id. at
1037. The district court ordered Shore Realty and LeoGrande to remove the haz-
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courts derived the standard of strict liability from the legislative his56
tory of CERCLA.
CERCLA also lacks any explicit instruction as to apportionment of liability. When faced with this issue in United States v. ChemDyne, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio determined that, consistent with legislative intent, common
law principles would control. 57 As a result, the court adopted the
joint and several apportionment position articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 433A and 433B. 58 Specifically, the
Restatement requires that independent actors causing a single
harm bear a pro rata share of the liability when the harm is divisible.5 9 However, in the case of indivisible harm, each individual acardous waste stored on the property and held them liable for costs under section
107(a) (4) (A) of CERCLA. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding. See id. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that Shore Realty was
liable as an owner of property and that LeoGrande was liable as an operator under
CERCLA. See id. at 1049-53.
56. See id. at 1042 (stressing that Congress intended responsible parties be
held strictly liable, notwithstanding absence of explicit provision included in statute). The Second Circuit noted that section 101 (32) of CERCILA states that liability under CERCLA shall be consistent with the standard of liability applied under
the Clean Air Act, which courts have held to be strict liability. See id. Further, the
court interpreted section 107 as providing strict liability. See id. The court noted,
however, that strict liability under CERCLA is not absolute; there are defenses
under 107(b) which absolve a party from liability under CERCLA. See id.
57. See United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
The court analyzed the effect on CERCLA's scope of liability of Congress's deletion from the statute of the term "joint and several liability." Id. The court concluded, however, that the deletion did not represent a rejection of joint and
several liability. See id. Instead, the court reasoned that the term was deleted in
order to permit the scope of liability to be determined according to common law
principles. See id. Thus, the court held that courts may perform "a case by case
evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated with multiple-generator
waste sites... [and] assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an
individualized basis." Id.
58. See id. at 810. The court concluded that an absolute adoption of the joint
and several liability standard would be inconsistent with CERCLA's legislative history. See id.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). Section 433A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
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tor is subject to liability for the entire harm. 60 While a minority of
courts digress from the Chem-Dyne decision and permit judicial dis-

cretion consistent with equitable principles, the rule enunciated in
Chem-Dyne continues to be the majority approach. 61 Clearly, the potential of liability for an entire harm poses a serious economic risk
62
for a lender.
Ambiguity in statutory provisions has also been recognized
with regard to the imposition of liability for "owners," "operators,"
and those who "arrange for disposal." 63 Although CERCLA specifically excludes from liability a person whose interest is limited to

protection of a security interest, 64 mortgagees have repeatedly
60. See id. § 433B. This section states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that
the tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to
limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon
each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there
is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such
actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
Id.
61. See Suzanne S. Dickey, Note, U.S. EPA v. Sequa Corp. (In Re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc.): The Fifth Circuit Limits the Imposition ofJoint and Several Liability
on CERCLA Defendants, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1663, 1666 (1994) (concluding that majority of courts follow 1983 court decision in United States v. Chem-Dyne).
62. Potential responsibility for an entire harm is also significant in view of the
determination that bankruptcy discharges CERCLA liability, unless a company
continues to own contaminated property following reorganization. See Catherine
M. Madore & Janie Breggin, EnvironmentalLiability Associated with Real Estate Transfers, 22 COLO. LAw. 67, 68 (1993).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.
1990) (finding that participation of Fleet Factors Corporation in final managerial
activities of textile company which had declared bankruptcy was sufficient to trigger liability); Sanford St. Local Dev. Corp. v. Textron, 768 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (concluding that Textron's discounted sale of property containing
hazardous substances amounted to "arranging for disposal" of substances for CERCIA liability purposes); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573 (D. Md. 1986) (holding Maryland Bank and Trust Company liable as owner
based upon acquisition of title following foreclosure).
64. See CERCLA § 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (A) (1994). This section
states:
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the
case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title, or control
of which was conveyed due to delinquency, abandonment, or similar
means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
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found themselves with potential liability exposure. In fact, a mortgagee must consider the threat of liability as an owner or operator
65
in the context of activity prior to or following foreclosure.
In 1989, in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania considered a pre-foreclosure action of a bank. 66 Relying on
the fact that the actions of the bank did not indicate that it had
actual control of the property, the court found that the bank fell
within CERCLA's security interest exemption and thus was not liable. 67

However, in 1990, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., the

security interest exemption was more strictly construed. In that
case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the capacity to control, without
more, may trigger liability. 68 That same year, in Hill v. East Asiatic
forehand. Such term does not include a person who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
65. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 64. There are four categories of liable
parties under CERCLA: (1) site owners and operators; (2) prior owners at the time
of disposal; (3) generators; and (4) transporters of waste. See id. As a result, lenders are affected in two ways. See id. First, a lender may be considered an operator
if it involves itself in the management of a mortgagee. See id. Second, a lender
may become an owner by foreclosing on a mortgage. See id. Thus, both the preforeclosure and the post-foreclosure situations present a liability risk to the lender.
See id.
66. See generally Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co., 732 F.
Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). In Guidice, borough residents brought suit against a
property owner, alleging unlawful contamination of the environment and sought
to recover response costs under CERCLA. See id. The property owner also
brought a third-party action against current and past owners of adjacent property,
seeking indemnification, contribution and response costs from owners, including
the mortgagee bank which held tide to the adjacent property for eight months. See
id.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held
that: (1) the bank's conduct before it purchased the property at a sheriffs sale did
not remove it from CERCLA's security interest exception and (2) CERCLA's security interest exception did not apply during the time which the bank was the record
owner of property. See id.
67. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 66. In Guidice, the bank had met with the
borrower to discuss the management and operations of the plant. See id. In addition, the bank had assisted the borrower in complying with its wastewater discharge. See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 558.
68. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557-58. In Fleet Factors, the United States brought an action against Fleet Factors Corporation
("Fleet") to be reimbursed for expenses used to remove hazardous waste from a
bankrupt textile facility. See id. at 1552. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment because it concluded that Fleet's activities at the facility might rise to the level of
participation in management sufficient to impose liability under CERCLA. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Fleet
was liable under section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA for its activities. See id. at 1560.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/2

18

in Order to Preserve
Non-Commercial Property
ENCOURAGING
INDUSTRY
1998] Vasiliades: Encouraging Industry

Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), the Ninth Circuit declined to follow
the rigid approach applied in Fleet Factors. The Ninth Circuit held
that exercise of actual participation in management is a prerequisite to the imposition of liability. 69 Despite this alternate holding,
however, the strict Fleet Factors holding continues to influence lenders. 70 The court's refusal to apply the security interest exemption
subsequent to foreclosure by lenders has also forced lenders to be
71
cautious.
In 1992, EPA issued a lender liability rule in an effort to clarify
CERCLA liability and avoid further inconsistencies in judicial interpretation. 72 The new rule specified that actual managerial participation, rather than mere inchoate control, was necessary for the
imposition of liability. 7 3 In addition, the rule specified that parties

could not be held liable under CERCLA for foreclosing on property, preserving the value of property, or holding property while
entertaining reasonable offers.7 4 This lender liability rule, however,
was rejected in Kelley v. EPA.75 In Kelley, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that EPA had
However, because there remained disputed issues of material fact, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. See id.
69. See generally Hill v. East Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1990). In Hill, a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of
lead recycling, Bergsoe Metals, had various hazardous substances at its plant site in
St. Helens, Oregon. See id. at 669. The Port Authority of St. Helens ("the Port")
and the United States National Bank of Oregon ("Bank") financed the St. Helens
plant, which became bankrupt as a result of financial difficulties. See id. The issue
was whether the Port was responsible for the cleanup costs under CERCLA.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Port
was not an "owner" liable for environmental cleanup costs under CERCLA because
the Port had an "indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest and
...[the Port] did not participate in the management of the Bergsoe recycling
plant." Id. at 673.
70. See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 74. Many lenders have argued that the
industry is currently in a credit crisis. See id. This perception is pervasive among
members of both Congress and banks. See id. As a result of this crisis, banks have
"begun to behave in a more cautious, protectionist manner." Id.
71. See id. at 83-84. In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., the court
held that once a bank forecloses, the bank no longer holds indicia of ownership,
but instead holds full tide. See 632 F. Supp. 573, 576-80 (D. Md. 1986). As a result,
the bank no longer qualifies for the secured creditor exemption. See id.
72. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;
Lender Liability under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1994).
73. See id. § 300.1100(c).
74. See id. § 300.1100(d).
75. 15 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Kelley, the State of Michigan and a
chemical manufacturers' association filed a petition for review of a final EPA regulation, which defined the scope of lender liability under CERCLA. See id. at 1103.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the regulation should be vacated because Congress intended that the judiciary,
rather than EPA, adjudicate the scope of CERCLA liability. See id. at 1109.
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exceeded its rulemaking authority authorized by Congress. 76 In
light of these decisions, it is clear that reforming CERCLA could
provide greater certainty and uniformity in the area of lender activity. Greater predictability would encourage lenders to provide financing for the redevelopment of brownfields.
V.

FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSE TO THE BROWNFIELDS
RECLAMATION DILEMMA

Programs encouraging the recycling and reuse of brownfields
have been proposed and implemented on the state and federal
levels in response to the urgent need to preserve resources and foster economic development. At the federal level, EPA has introduced the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative (BERI).
Many states, however, have opted for voluntary cleanup plans.
These state and federal plans, together with statutory modifications
to CERCLA, could effectively reform the current Superfund
77
program.
A. Agency Response and Resolution
BERI employs a six-part scheme to facilitate the redevelopment
of contaminated sites. 78 First, BERI awards fifty pilot grants of up to
$200,000 each over two years, in order to encourage participation
by communities, investors, lenders, and others to clean up sites. In
doing so, BERI provides redevelopment models and cleanup guidelines. 79 Second, BERI provides technical assistance to state and local communities. 80 Third, BERI offers job training and
development activities.8 ' Fourth, BERI provides technical guidance. 82 Fifth, BERI includes a Common Sense Initiative (CSI),
which brings together representatives from industry, public interest
76. See id. at 1108-09. The D.C. Circuit recognized the clarity provided by the

EPA rule, however, it concluded that EPA's authority was limited to reconciling
statutory ambiguities. See id. The D.C. Circuit held that only Congress has interpretive rulemaking power. See id. at 1108. The D.C. Circuit explained that EPA's
authority is limited to bringing the question of the interpretation of a statute to a
federal court as the "prosecutor." See id.
77. On September 29, 1995, Senator Smith described the current Superfund
program as a "bewildering mix of lawyers, bureaucrats, insurers, small business
owners, polluters and others trapped in a tangled web of retroactive, joint, strict
and several liability," and as an example of "good intentions gone bad .... " 141
CONG. PEc. S14,711 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Smith).
78. See Wise, supra note 50, at 151.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 152.
82. See id.
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groups, regulators and others, in order to combine efforts in reaching solutions. 83 Finally, BERI coordinates resources and defines
roles of federal, state and local agencies, organizations, and businesses. 8 4 Senator Bond quoted author Gregg Easterbrook in
describing BERI as "ecological realism at its finest, balancing the
needs of nature and commerce.

85

In addition to BERI, EPA encourages remediation of commercial property by providing refuge for prospective purchasers. Specifically, EPA may enter agreements providing a covenant not to sue
purchasers for existing contamination. 8 6 The primary criteria considered by EPA in determining whether to enter into such agreements include: (1) current or potential EPA action at the facility;
(2) benefits from cleanup; (3) whether continued operation will
exacerbate the conditions at the site, interfere with EPA response,
or create health risks; and (4) the financial condition of the
87
purchaser.
Alternatively, EPA may provide a letter, called a "status" or
"comfort" letter, setting forth the status of the site and EPA's intentions with regard thereto. 88 This correspondence does not insulate
the purchaser from further action. This correspondence does,
however, offer prospective purchasers a realistic indication of the
current status of the facility. 89
B.

Statutory Reform

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have been
active with debate regarding a variety of bills proposing to establish
programs to reclaim brownfields and regain lost vitality in urban
areas. 90 In addition, EPA has articulated four goals in this regard. 9 1
83. See Wise, supra note 50, at 152.
84. See id. at 153.
85. 141 CONG. REC. S14,367 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.

Bond).

Senator Bond also quoted author Phillip Howard, who said "EPA's

Brownfields initiative represents an important change in direction. It will help the

environment and the economy at the same time by dealing with the problem of
contaminated properties in a common sense way." Id. Senator Bond concluded
that the initiative is a "win-win proposition for everybody. We are delighted to
accept the amendment on this side." Id.
86. See Keener, supra note 52, at 146.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id.
See id. at 149-50.
See id.
See, e.g., Reform of Superfund Act, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1217 (Sept. 29,

1995).
91. See Superfund Legislative Goals on 'Brownfields' Outlined by EPA Officials at
Conference, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1096 (Oct. 20, 1995).
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First, EPA has urged Congress to adopt a uniform definition of
brownfields as industrial property remaining unused due to pollution. Second, EPA has sought delineation of the relative authority
of federal, state and local regulation. Third, EPA has desired the
establishment of definite triggers and limits of liability. Finally, EPA
92
has sought the effective use of Superfund financing.
In furtherance of these goals, Congress and state legislatures
have proposed legislation. Generally, the proposed bills have included funding, through federal grants and interest-free loans, and
protection for purchasers and lenders. 9 3 In addition, the legislatures have suggested tax incentives by means of contributions to an
94
established brownfields Individual Retirement Account (IRA).
The proposed legislation from the so-called "rust belt" states has
included many of these concepts. 9 5 However, the Clinton Administration's reactions and proposals for reform highlight the obstacles
96
to regain use of urban property.
On August 3, 1995, Representative Borski of Pennsylvania, supported by representatives of the "rust belt" states, introduced a
97
brownfields cleanup program in the House of Representatives.
Describing the Superfund as a 'job killer" and a general hindrance
to economic revitalization, Representative Borski suggested that
money from the Superfund be set aside for urban redevelopment.
He suggested that the funding should be in the form of grants ($45
million total) and loans ($90 million total). In addition, Representative Borski proposed establishing liability shields for prospective
purchasers who "have no connection with the waste disposal."9 8
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. E1625 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Brown). Representative Brown of Ohio, supported by Representative Klink of
Pennsylvania and others introduced legislation on August 4, 1995, which proposed
to establish grant and loan programs and provide protection to purchasers and
lenders. See id.
94. See 142 CONG. REc. H978 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Franks). On January 31, 1996, Representative Franks of New Jersey introduced a
bill creating a brownfields IRA which would allow tax-free contributions of up to
15 million. See id.
95. See McWilliams, supra note 7, at 712 n.15 (identifying "rust belt" states as
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois.)
96. See id. at 712-13.
97. See 141 CONG. REc. E1623 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Borski). Representative Borski stressed that the brownfields cleanup program
would increase employment opportunities in the nation's major cities which have
hampered its workers with inflexible environmental laws. See id. Specifically, Representative Borski stated that "[t]his bill is necessary because Superfund has become an obstacle to the economic redevelopment of our cities." Id.
98. Id. Specifically, Representative Borski proposed that $45 million be made
available for grants to cities for site characterization work and $90 million be af-
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Representative Borski also commended EPA Administrator Carol
Browner for delisting 25,000 sites from the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System list.99
Promoting the encouragement of investment by private parties, Representative Richard Gephardt of Missouri joined Representative Borski on the floor of the House. Representative Gephardt
received support from Representatives Brown and Stokes of Ohio,
Representative Dingell of Michigan, Representatives Borski and
Klink of Pennsylvania, Representative Rush of Illinois, Representatives Manton and Towns of New York, and Representative Furse of
Oregon. 10 0 Representative Gephardt proposed a bill containing
three major objectives, namely, funding, clarifying lender liability,
and protecting prospective purchasers who exercise good faith. 10 1
According to Representative Gephardt, funding would be achieved
by interest-free loans or grants, financed by the Superfund. Moreover, the loans and grants would be awarded on the basis of relative
capacity to provide employment and the amount of local support.
Local support would be measured by the amount of local participation and local funding available. 10 2 In addition, funding for envi-

forded to cities for cleanup work. See id. Moreover, the bill included protection
for potential buyers of property who may be discouraged from purchasing land for
fear of potential liability. See id.
99. See id. Representative Borski emphasized that the brownfields problem
has had a major impact on communities across the country, and noted that "experts have estimated as many as 500,000 contaminated sites.., could be available
for productive industrial development if the liability issue was settled." Id.
100. See 141 CONG. REC. E1622 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Gephardt). Representative Gephardt made clear, however, that the legislation will
not resolve all aspects of the problem. See id. at 1623. Rather, he suggested that an
erasing of the problem necessitates a comprehensive reform of the Superfund bill.
See id. Furthermore, he noted that the treatment of leaking underground storage
tanks is also an important issue that must be addressed. See id.
101. See id. at E1622-23. Representative Gephardt concluded that the proposed legislation was a significant step towards "confronting the most important
factors that have blocked redevelopment of communities throughout urban and
rural America." Id.
102. See id. at E1622. Representative Gephardt explained the purpose of this
proposed legislation as follows:
[This legislation was designed to] help provide funding that the private
sector cannot always provide .... Local government entities, such as the
St. Louis community development agency, would be able to apply and
compete for interest-free loans or grants to perform site assessments and
cleanup activities. The grants and loans would be competitively awarded
based on their capacity to create new jobs, as well as the amount of local
participation and financial support.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

23

52

VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,LAW
Vol. 9,JOURNAL
Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 2[Vol.

IX: p. 29

ronmental assessment would be provided in order to dispel some
103
uncertainty as to potential remediation cost.

Regarding lender liability, Representative Gephardt also stated
that the Fleet Factorsdecision obfuscated the security interest exception under CERCLA. To remedy the confusion, he proposed that
the lender liability standard be clarified to exclude lenders who are
not managing daily operations or contributing to contamination. 104
Finally, Representative Gephardt's proposed bill suggested to eliminate liability for prospective purchasers who conducted certain pre10 5
cautionary measures prior to purchase.
On August 4, 1995, Representative Brown of Ohio, supported
by the "rust belt" states representatives, reiterated the above concerns and proposed similar legislation to address the brownfields
problem. 10 6 Like Representative Gephardt's bill, Representative
Brown's bill, House Bill 2178, included a federal grant program
and protection for lenders and prospective purchasers. Represen103. See id. Representative Gephardt emphasized that the nation's major cities have stressed that site characterizations and assessments are very helpful in marketing contaminated sites to potential purchasers or developers. See id. For
instance, he suggested that parties are more likely to invest in brownfield properties after determining the level of contamination because the projected cleanup
costs are better known. See id. Thus, he proposed authorizing EPA to afford local
governments over $15 million in annual payments to perform such assessments.
See id.
104. See id. at E1623. More precisely, Representative Gephardt stated:
This legislation clarifies the lender liability issue in order to encourage
private sector investment. The [Eleventh Circuit's decision in United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp.] obscured the intent of Superfund's securedlenders exemption. This confusion has made many lenders reluctant to
become involved in potentially contaminated properties. Bankers now
often fear that their interest may make them subject to cleanup liability
for newly discovered or released contamination. The bill makes it clear
that lenders who are merely performing a lending function and not managing a site's daily operations or contributing to the contamination can
lend for redevelopment purposes without fear of incurring environmental liabilities.
Id.
105. See 141 CONG. REc. E1623 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Gephardt). Representative Gephardt also stressed that the bill provides protection
for good-faith buyers of property. See id. For instance, the bill exempts potential
purchasers from liability when they acquire property subsequently found to be
contaminated if the purchaser takes certain precautionary measures. See id. Thus,
unlike Superfund, this legislation permits a purchaser who inspects the site carefully to avoid liability if contamination is subsequently discovered. See id.
106. See 141 CONG. REC. E1625 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Brown). Representative Brown stressed that the proposed legislation addressed
the problem in which land is used for industrial purposes and subsequently abandoned upon discovery of contamination. See id. Specifically, the bill introduced a
grant program for local communities to assist them in determining the extent of
the land's contamination. See id.
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tative Brown's bill, however, also included a "revolving loan fund"
107
to be repaid over the course of ten years.
Prior to the close of 1995, Representative Lewis of California
submitted a conference report from the Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
other independent agencies regarding a proposed bill, House Bill
2099.108 Two particular amendments of House Bill 2099 were relevant to the brownfields issue. Specifically, amendment 74 of House
Bill 2099 aimed to prohibit funding for the listing of sites on the
NPL unless the governor of the host state provided a written request to the EPA Administrator. 10 9 According to Representative
Lewis, this amendment was consistent with congressional intent because Congress had intended to delegate Superfund responsibility
to the states and to reduce Superfund spending. 1 0 Amendment 75
of House Bill 2099 proposed to terminate funding for BERI, which
was scheduled to receive funds to complete the fifty pilots by the
end of the 1996 fiscal year. Instead, amendment 75 directed EPA
to provide financial assistance to local communities for assessment
of sites to ensure current, rather than future, levels of funding."'
Also in 1995, Senator Smith introduced the Accelerated
Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act of 1995 as a bill to
107. See id. Representative Brown noted that this bill established a revolving
loan fund for local governments to facilitate their funding of cleanup actions. See
id. Representative Brown stressed the importance of fiscal responsibility in developing brownfields legislation. See id. Noting the economic realities recognized by
Representative Brown, one commentator noted that "[n]o local, state, or regional
economy gains when sites remain dormant and adjoining neighborhoods suffer."
Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriersto Redevelopment and Prospectsfor Change, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 285 (1995).
108. See 141 CONG. REc. H13,249 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Lewis).
109. See id. at H13,268 (statement of Rep. Lewis).
110. See id. One commentator noted that state governments have been limited by federal law but that states have been active in this area within the limitations of federal law. See Solo, supra note 107, at 288-90.
111. See 141 CONG. REc. H13,268 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Lewis). Representative Lewis noted:
The conferees are in agreement as to the importance of the Brownfields
programs and direct the agency to provide financial assistance to local
cummunities [sic] to expedite the assessment of brownfields sites in order to ensure early remediation of these properties in conjunction with
local economic development goals. The Brownfields initiative is to be
funded at no less than the current level.
Id. Representative Lewis further recognized that while the authorizing committees
are in the process of revamping the Superfund program and that "honest disagreements" exist, "there nevertheless are many things the agency can and should be
doing now within the context of reform that amount to nothing more than good
government." Id.
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reauthorize and amend CERCLA. 112 This voluminous legislation
had several significant sections. First, the bill amended section
201(b) (8) of CERCLA to provide between two and five percent of
Superfund to each state which notified the EPA Administrator of its
intent to establish a qualifying program.1 1 3 Second, the bill also
amended CERCLA by defining a brownfield facility as land presently or previously containing abandoned or under-used commercial or industrial property, which is hindered in redevelopment or
11 4
expansion by hazardous substances present or possibly present.
The definition was expressly limited in the bill by excluding listed
or proposed NPL sites.1 15 Third, the bill provided for interest-free
loans of $100,000 for one year and no more than $200,000 in total,
to be repaid within ten years.1 1 6 The loans, however, would be

112. See 141 CONG. REC. S14,716 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith). The bill provided that the specific amount of funding allocated to a state
be calculated by multiplying the total amount of the Superfund by a fraction. See
id. The bill further provided that the numerator of the fraction would equal the
number of facilities in the particular state listed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System list, but would
exclude NPL sites. The denominator would reflect the total number of like facilities nationwide. See id.
113. See id. Senator Smith noted that the Superfund program has inadequately met the demands associated with the growing brownfields problem. See id.
at S14,711. For example, the expectation of Superfund, when enacted in 1980, was
to address the cleanup of a few hundred sites each year. See id. However, by 1995,
there were over 1,300 sites on the NPL, and 30-40 sites have been being added
each year. See id.
114. See id. at S14,711.
115. See id. Senator Smith stressed that the bill represented an effort to respond to the broad-based concerns and problems with the Superfund Program.
See id. More precisely, Senator Smith emphasized that "the legislation will accelerate the pace of cleanups by reducing cleanup costs, reducing litigation costs, and
providing economic incentives for PRPs to stay on site and get the job done." Id.
116. See id. The general provisions for these loans stated that "[o]n approval
of an application made by an eligible entity, the Administrator may make interestfree loans out of the Fund to the eligible entity to be used for the site characterization and assessment of 1 or more brownfield facilities." Id. Moreover, the proposed legislation also provided:
Each loan made under this section shall be subject to an agreement
that(A) requires the eligible entity to comply with all applicable State laws
(including regulations);
(B) requires that the eligible entity shall use the loan exclusively for purposes specified in paragraph (2); and
(C) contains such other terms and conditions as the Administrator determines to be necessary to protect the financial interests of the United
States and to carry out the purposes of this section.
Id. at S14,717.
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available for only five years following enactment of the bill.1 17 To
receive a loan under the provisions of the bill, a facility and the
redevelopment plan would have to be sufficiently described, including an explanation of the potential to stimulate economic development and create jobs. a1 8 Fourth, the bill protected purchasers from
liability provided the purchaser conducted satisfactory inquiries
prior to purchase of the property and did not exacerbate the contamination. Fifth, the bill limited lender and lessor liability if the
interest in the property was created by foreclosure, a security interest or extension of credit. Finally, the bill excluded landowners adjacent to NPL sites from liability if the contamination was due to a
contiguous site. 1 9
Early in 1996, a particularly poignant bill was introduced into
the House of Representatives concerning the brownfields problem.
Recognizing the financial impediment to redevelopment, Representative Coyne of Pennsylvania proposed a tax incentive contained
in the Brownfields Redevelopment Act to encourage private sector
remediation. a20 The tax incentive provided a fifty percent credit
for payments made pursuant to an EPA approved remediation plan
or a plan approved by a designated state agency. The tax incentive,
however, was subject to several restrictions. Specifically, sites would
have to remain fallow for one year, be unlikely to undergo development without this assistance, demonstrate a significant potential for
new employment, and redevelopment would have to be capable of
being concluded in a reasonably short period of time.' 2 ' In addition, the tax incentive would be available only to "innocent owners."1 22 The bill contained several other noteworthy provisions.
First, the bill provided that the interest paid on qualified redevelop117. See 141

CONG. REc.

S14,716 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995). The bill specifi-

cally stated that "[n]o amount shall be available for the Fund for purposes of this
section after the fifth fiscal year after the date of enactment of this section." Id.
Also, the bill provided that entities are prohibited from using any part of the loan
"for payment of penalties, fines, or administrative costs." Id. at S14,717.
118. See id. at S14,717.
119. See id. at S14,736.
120. See 142 CONG. REc. E16 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Coyne). This bill is now included as Subtitle C of More Power for Empowerment
Zones Act of 1996, House Bill 3241, introduced on April 15, 1996 by Representative Foglietta. See 142 CONG. REc. H3386 (April 15, 1996).
121. See id. Representative Coyne stressed that the cleanup and revitalization

of old, abandoned industrial sites has been a central issue for our nation's cities.
See id. He further noted that these sites present both public health and pollution
problems, and serious impediments to the economic well-being of the surrounding areas. See id.
122. See id. Representative Coyne pointed out that the amelioration of
brownfields is contingent on the availability of affordable financing for the imple-
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ment bonds would be tax exempt. Thus, the federal government
would in effect be subsidizing worthy local redevelopment.1 2 3 Second, the bill removed the qualification that the proposed site be at
124
least 100 acres in size.
Making similar efforts for reform, Representative Franks of
New Jersey addressed the House on January 31, 1996, suggesting
the creation of a brownfields IRA. The IRA would permit tax-free
contributions of up to $5 million for the exclusive use of
1 25
brownfields remediation.
Supporting the assumption of greater authority by the states in
the redevelopment of brownfields, Representative Bliley, a republican from Virginia, proposed House Bill 2500, amendments to the
Reform of Superfund Act, which had been sponsored by Representative Oxley of Ohio. 126 Representative Bliley indicated that the
amendments' most significant features were the elimination of the
federal permit requirement for brownfields cleanup and the certainty it would provide.1 2 7 In addition, Representative Bliley proposed that generators and transporters be exempt from liability.
mentation of effective redevelopment programs. See id. As a result, his proposed
legislation sought to alleviate the financial impediments to these programs. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. Representative Coyne concluded that "the financial assistance
provided in this bill would be a valuable tool in the environmental and economic
redevelopment of America." Id.
125. See 142 CONG. REc. H978 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Franks). Representative Franks emphasized that the bill aimed to bring about new
employment opportunities and more revenue to dilapidated areas across the nation. See id. At the same time, Representative Franks asserted that the bill did not
compromise public health or environmental quality. See id.
126. See Superfund: Amendment to PendingHouse Superfund Bill Would Set Grants,
Loans for 'Brownfields,' 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1882 (Feb. 2, 1996). The major
objective of the proposed amendments to the Reform of Superfund Act has been
described as "giv[ing] relief to'small businesses by carving out certain disposal sites
from the liability web and . . . [enabling] states to assume more control over
superfund sites." Id. In support of these amendments, Representative Bliley stated
that "'[w]hen it comes to reinvesting in America's industrial core, the one thing
everyone wants is certainty ....
Developers, lenders, local governments alike those willing to redevelop America's industrial sites - need to know, deserve to
know, that their efforts won't be second guessed, or impeded by government regulators.'" Id.
127. See id. Senator Christopher Bond viewed the redevelopment of
brownfields as "'one of the best investments we can make.'" Id. At the same time,
one commentator noted that:
The future implications for cities is bleak as a result of the strange cycle
created by Superfund liability. Though urban industrial property may be
less expensive than other development property, the full costs is actually
prohibitive. In determining actual costs to a purchaser, both cleanup cost
and the cost of potential future liability must be added to the purchase
price.
Solo, supra note 107, at 302-03.
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Representative Bliley did not, however, suggest altering liability for
128
owners and operators.
An increased state role was also supported by the United States
Conference of Mayors (Mayors' Conference), which met with President Clinton on January 25, 1996.129 The Mayors' Conference,
presenting a paper to President Clinton entitled "The Brownfields
Redevelopment Action Agenda, Initial Framework," proposed constructing a program of tax incentives, reduced liability for lenders
and less onerous regulatory burdens.1 30 The Mayors' Conference
recommended tax credits and revolving local funds to reduce the
131
risk of loss of initial investment and to encourage development.
While it seems that many of the aforementioned proposals
would benefit both the environment and the economy, these proposals have not gained universal support. For example, several
democrats in the House of Representatives have urged their republican colleagues, Representatives Bliley and Oxley, to reconsider
House Bill 2500, the proposed amendments to the Reform of
Superfund Act.13 2 In fact, the democratic "rust belt" representatives, Representative Dingell of Michigan, Representative Gephardt
of Missouri and Representative Brown of Ohio, requested republi128. See Superfund: Amendment to PendingHouse Superfund Bill Would Set Grants,
Loansfor 'Brownfields,'supranote 126, at 1882. Representative Bliley explained that
while the details of the amendment were still being refined, he does not intend to
pay polluters. See id. Rather, his liability scheme aimed at reducing the cost of
complex litigation. See id. Representative Bliley stated that his proposal "takes that
$7 billion 'out of the courtroom, and puts it out there at the 1,300 toxic waste
sites,' where it belongs." Id.
129. See Hazardous Waste: Mayors Release Proposalon Brownfields; President Urges
Support for Tax Incentives, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1871 (Feb. 2, 1996). Specifically,
the United States Conference of Mayors (Mayors' Conference) released a fivepoint paper requesting both President Clinton and Congress to develop a
brownfields program that would include liability protection for lenders, innocent
third-party purchasers, and redevelopers of brownfields. See id. The Mayors' Conference also supported a targeted remediation tax credit program. See id.
130. See id. At the conference President Clinton stated that "[w]e want to
help communities to clean up old waste sites by giving tax incentives to those who
will buy and clean them up.. . ." Id. Expressing his concern regarding regulatory
burdens, the President concluded that "I believe we can get broad bipartisan support for the brownfields initiative." Id.
131. See id. One analyst, recognizing the connection between environmental
laws and economics, commented that "Superfund has had an impact on industry
and economics, because it has affected decisions of business owners, developers,
lenders, insurers, and urban populations." Solo, supra note 107, at 303.
132. See Superfund: House Democrats Urge GOP to Separate Brownfields Provision
from CERCLA Bill, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2001 (Feb. 16, 1996). The democrats argued that "a separate bill would expedite assistance to areas affected by these abandoned industrial sites." Id. However, the republicans responded that "superfund
reform legislation cannot proceed without a brownfields title because it is an integral part of superfund reform." Id.
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can Representative Bliley of Virginia to advance a bipartisan
brownfields bill separate from the Reform of Superfund Act. These
democratic congressmen have made known their lack of confidence in the future of Superfund. 13 3 Integrating brownfields reform into a bill with an arguably less than promising future could
13 4
sound the death knell for brownfields redevelopment initiatives.
This situation exemplifies the hindrances caused by the political
agenda advanced by legislators, despite the common goals of economic revitalization and redevelopment of industrial property.
Unfortunately, the opposing viewpoints of republicans and
democrats appear to be at an impasse. Illustrating the reasons for
the deadlock, one republican staff member in the House of Representatives compared the republican sponsored bill, House Bill
2500, with the democratic sponsored bill, House Bill 2178, and argued that the republican sponsored bill was more consistent with
the recommendations supported by the United States Conference
of Mayors. 13 5 According to this staff member, the republican sponsored bill addressed five of the points included in the paper produced by the Mayors' Conference, while House Bill 2178 addressed
only two. 1 3 6 In closing, the staff member commented on the lack of
support from House democrats in drafting House Bill 2500, and
stated "'we're going to move [House Bill] 2500, and these guys had
1 7
better get used to it.""

133. See id.The House democrats noted the expiration of corporate and excise taxes from which Superfund derives its funding, casts a looming shadow of
doubt over the future vitality of CERCLA. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. These House democrats noted the parallel funding notions and
levels of Representative Bliley's proposed amendments and House Bill 2178, a bill
introduced by House democrats. See id. Expressing their disapproval of Representative Bliley's proposal, the democrats commented that "there is little or no chance
of the House acting quickly to pass a broad superfund bill that can win approval in
the Senate and be sent to the president to be signed into law." Id.
136. See id. Whether from the democrats or from the republicans, the need
for change and amendment exists. See Solo supra note 107, at 305-07 (explaining
that CERC[A was not designed to dissuade buyers from creating "environmentally
sound development").
137. See Superfund: House Democrats Urge GOP to Separate Brownfields Provision
from CERCLA Bill, supra note 132, at 2001. Regardless of which political party suggests change, solutions and proposals must be scrutinized as follows:
Proposed solutions and strategies for cleanup and redevelopment of
brownfields must be evaluated with respect to the original purposes of
Superfund legislation: to protect public health and environment and to
invoke strict, joint, and several liability on the parties "responsible" for
contaminating our land and water ....
See Solo, supra note 107, at 307.
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At the same time, some congressmen have not allowed political
parties to hinder their efforts for reform. On February 26, 1996,
members of the New Jersey Congressional Delegation, including
Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Donald Payne, both
democrats from New Jersey, urged bipartisan support of EPA's
brownfields' initiative. Without specifically mentioning House Bill
2500 or any other bill, Senator Lautenberg criticized legislation
which would reduce liability of "corporate polluters." 138 Representative Payne agreed with Senator Lautenberg, articulating the polar
perceptions of some elected officials and environmentalists. 139 Interestingly enough, Representative Payne also expressed approval
of House Bill 2919, which was sponsored in part by Representative
Franks, a republican from New Jersey. The bill proposed releasing
lenders, developers, local governments and purchasers from lender
40
liability and creating a "brownfields IRA."1
Despite Representative Payne's democratic approval of Representative Frank's republican initiative, discord has continued. Political and ideological conflict was expressed in an exchange of
correspondence from February 14 - 16, 1996, between ranking
House Commerce Committee member democratic Representative
Dingell and the Committee Chair, republican Representative
Bliley. 14 Receiving support from democratic Representatives
Gephardt and Brown, Representative Dingell proposed that the
brownfields issue receive immediate attention by way of stand-alone
legislation, rather than awaiting the overhaul of CERCLA pursuant
to House Bill 2500. Representative Bliley criticized this suggestion
138. See Superfund: Initiative on Brownfields Redevelopment Backed by Members of
New Jersey Delegation, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2070 (Mar. 1, 1996). In practice, releasing corporate polluters from liability is very common among state voluntary
cleanup programs under which the developing party receives a reduction in liability if it proceeds with redevelopment of a contaminated piece of land. See Solo,
supra note 107, at 311 n.146.
139. See Superfund: Initiative on Brownfields Redevelopment Backed by Members of
New Jersey Delegation, supra note 138, at 2070. Representative Payne, a democrat
from New Jersey, stated "Ibelieve that many of our nation's elected officials lack
vision ...[and consequently] ...[mlany mistakenly claim that environmentalists
choke the life out of industry and business." Id. Payne concluded that
"[u]nfortunately some lenders place corporate profit above public health and
safety." Id.
140. See id.
141. See Superfund: House Lenders Support Bipartisan Effort on Brownfields, Other
CFRLCA Reform Issues, supra note 4, at 2036. At the Mayors' Conference, President
Tom Rice noted that "[w]e're here to tell Washington that bickering and blaming
is not playing well on Main Street .... Government shutdowns and stop-gap,

underfunded continuing resolutions are unacceptable. They have caused great
harm in local communities and damaged public confidence in America's future."
Mayors Tell Feds: Get Your Act Together, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, Jan. 29, 1996, at n.1.
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as "advocating a piecemeal approach" to reform which would be
ineffective in reforming the Superfund program and reducing litigation. 14 2 Still, both Representatives indicated a willingness to pur143
sue bipartisan support for reform.
Not surprisingly, Representative Rick White, a republican from
Washington, noted that the lack of consensus among members of
the Commerce Committee was a major obstacle in enacting House
Bill 2500.144 Additionally, issues concerning releasing generators
and transporters from retroactive liability, funding through grants
and zero-interest loans to local governments, and the expediency of
cleanup created obstacles for the bill's passage. 145 President Clinton has criticized the position generally articulated by republicans
regarding these issues. In response, Representative Bliley argued
that the delays caused by bureaucratic and litigation costs frustrate
cleanup efforts. He also indicated that the average resulting delay
14 6
in remediation of a site is at least twelve years.
Thus, although the majority of federal actors have recognized
the benefits of economic revitalization and remediation of contaminated property, and have proposed similar methods of achieving
those goals, a cohesive program for brownfields redevelopment
seems elusive. However, on March 11, 1996, President Clinton articulated some signs of compromise when he spoke at Fairleigh
Dickinson University and announced his administration's program
to restore brownfields. 14 7 The proposed plan includes a $2 billion,
seven year tax incentive to encourage private investment and redevelopment of 30,000 sites in areas with a minimum poverty level of
twenty percent. 148 The plan also provides that lenders and subse142. See Superfund: House Lenders Support BipartisanEffort on Brownfields, Other
C1RLCA Reform Issues, supra note 4, at 2037.
143. See id.
144. See Superfund: Meetings Continue on GOP Reform Bill; Little Progress Seen on
Disputed Issues, supra note 5, at 2069.
145. See id. Representative Bliley challenged his opponents to create their
own plans since they are unsatisfied with his plan, but noted that "Bill Clinton talks
about the 10 million American children under the age of 12 who live within four

miles of a toxic waste site, but at the current snail's pace of superfund cleanup,
those children will be in their mid-20s before those sites are even cleaned up." Id.
146. See id.
147. See Superfund: Clinton Unveils Tax Incentive Plan to Restore 30,000 'Brownfield' Sites, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2140 (Mar. 15, 1996) (noting that President's program is designed to build on BERI by revitalizing communities that are currently

overburdened with abandoned industrial sites).
148. See id. President Clinton stated that the minimum poverty level of 20%
was implemented "to make it possible for brownfields investors to deduct their

cleanup expenses immediately and cut the costs for this type of investment in half
.....

Id. at 2140-41.
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quent purchasers "inheriting" contaminated property not be held
liable. 14 9 The program is intended to supplement EPA's initiative

and provides that cleanup expenses be fully deducted in the year
they are spent. The end result is a net tax subsidy by the United
States Treasury for seven years. 150 Moreover, not only do sites with
the requisite poverty level benefit, but sites under the EPA pilot
5
program also qualify for the tax incentive.' '
Despite partisan obstacles and bureaucratic set backs, an increased participation at the state and local levels is a common aspect of the federal proposals. Several states have created voluntary
response programs. 15 2 In addition, several other alternatives have
been articulated, including prospective purchaser agreements, status or comfort letters, lease arrangements with purchase options,
153
indemnification agreements and consent decrees.
C.

State Action

New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania have all initiated voluntary
cleanup programs.15 4 Such programs provide security to potential
owners by ensuring that EPA will not list them on the NPL. Also,
potential owners are assured that cleanup actions will abide by National Contingency Plan requirements. 1 55 These programs are preferable to mandatory cleanups because they effectively avoid
litigation while benefitting the environment as well as the economy. 15 6 Compliance with a voluntary program may also avoid the

declining property values often caused by the stigma of mandatory
cleanups.
On July 26, 1995, after New Jersey's voluntary program gained
EPA's approval, the City of Trenton received a pilot grant of
149. See id. at 2141.
150. See id.
151. See id. As of March 1996, 40 pilot programs had been implemented by
the administration to return existing brownfields to productive use. See id.
152. See Keener, supra note 52, at 144.
153. See id. at 149-50.
154. See Hazardous Waste: State Voluntary Cleanup ProgramsBetter than Mandatory
Cleanups, Speakers Claim, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 497 (June 30, 1995).
155. See Keener, supra note 52, at 144.
156. See Hazardous Waste: State Voluntary Cleanup ProgramsBetter than Mandatory
Cleanups, Speakers Claim, supra note 154, at 497 (stating that "[s] tate voluntary programs for redeveloping abandoned industrial property are cheaper, more flexible,

and quicker than mandatory cleanups and result in economic benefits for participating companies and communities"). The benefits of voluntary cleanups include
the avoidance of expensive and litigation-filled mandatory cleanups, revitalization
of an industrial area, use of existing infrastructure, and the sparing of greenfields
or undeveloped property from development. See id.
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$200,000 from EPA. 15 7 New Jersey's statutory scheme, effective as
of June 16, 1993, is known as the Industrial Site Recovery Act
(ISRA).158 Spurred by public concern regarding health and environmental risks caused by a legacy of contamination, the New

Jersey legislature enacted ISRA to protect public health and welfare
and encourage efficient and timely remediation without unnecessary financial burdens. 159
ISRA is designed to streamline the regulatory process by reducing regulatory oversight and establishing summary procedures. 160
The statute specifically excludes the holder of a mortgage or other
security interest from liability unless title is secured through foreclosure, court order or other process. 16 ' Also, the statute requires
an owner or operator planning to terminate ownership to notify the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and remediate the
site or provide the DEP with a copy of a valid remediation agree-

ment. 16 2 Implementation of the proposed remediation plan is sub157. See 141 CONG. REC. E1516 (daily ed. July 26, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
158. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 (West Supp. 1997). This section provides
that "[t]his act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Industrial Site Recovery
Act.'" Id.
159. See id. § 13:1K-7. Specifically, this provision provides:
The legislature finds that discharges of toxic chemicals dating back to
early industrialization have left a legacy of contaminated industrial property in this State; that in 1983, due to the growing public awareness and
concern of the risks to the public health and the environment and the
potential costs to the State to clean up abandoned contaminated sites,
the "Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act" was enacted.
Id.
160. See id. § 13:1K-7. Section 13:1K-7 also provides:
The Legislature therefore declares that it is the policy of this State to
protect the public health, safety, and the environment, to promote efficient and timely cleanups, and to eliminate any unnecessary financial
burden of remediating contaminated sites; that these policies can be
achieved by streamlining the regulatory process, by establishing summary
administrative procedures for industrial establishments that have previously undergone an environmental review, and by reducing oversight of
these industrial establishments where less extensive regulatory review will
ensure the same degree of protection to public health, safety, and the
environment; and that the new procedures established to this act shall be
designed to guard against redundancy from the regulatory process and to
minimize governmental involvement in certain business transactions.
Id.
161. See id. § 13:1K-8. Under section 13:1K-8, a change in ownership does not
include the "execution, delivery and filing or recording of any mortgage, security
interest, collateral assignment or other lien on real or personal property...." Id.
162. See id. § 13:1K-9(a). This section states in pertinent part:
The owner or operator of an industrial establishment planning to close
operations or transfer ownership or operations shall notify the department in writing, no more than five days subsequent to closing operations
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ject to DEP approval. 163 An owner, however, is exempted from the
remediation requirements if the total quantity of hazardous substances is less than five hundred pounds or fifty-five gallons. If,
however, hazardous and nonhazardous substances are mixed, the
total quantity of hazardous and nonhazardous substances cannot
exceed five hundred pounds or fifty-five gallons in order to meet
the requirements of the exemption. Moreover, if the substances
consist of hydraulic or lubricating oil, the total quantity of oil cannot exceed two hundred twenty gallons in order to qualify for the
exemption1 64
With respect to enforcement, the Act provides for penalties of
$25,000.00 per day for noncompliance. 1 65 These penalties may be
imposed for unapproved transfers or failure to comply with an Ador of its public release of its decision to close operations, whichever occurs first, or within five days after the execution of an agreement to transfer ownership or operations, as applicable. The notice to the department
shall: identify the subject industrial establishment; describe the transaction . . .; state the date of the closing of operations or the date of the
public release of the decision to close operations as evidenced by a copy
of the appropriate public announcement, if applicable; state the date of
the execution of the agreement to transfer ownership or operations and
the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the parties to the transfer, if applicable; state the proposed date for closing operations or transferring ownership or operations ....
Id.
163. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9.6. The legislature set the following guidelines for reviewing a remediation plan: "Upon submission of the complete and
accurate results of a phase of the remediation . . . or of any other document required to be submitted that requires the department's review and approval ... the
department shall review and approve, approve with conditions, or disapprove the
submission or other documents . . . ." Id.
164. See id. § 13:1K-9.7. The remediation standard was the subject of discussion on December 15, 1995, when it was recommended that sites be considered
"clean" and future liability severed if contaminants are permanently reduced to an
increased lifetime cancer risk of one in one hundred thousand. See New Jersey: More
Lenient Risk Management StandardsRecommended by Commissionfor Cleanups, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1407 (Dec. 15, 1995). While the advocates of this standard argued
that it would stimulate remediation, opponents contended that the standard
prompts spending more money at the present time, but achieves less in terms of
cleanup and does not guarantee remediation of more sites. See id.
165. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-13(a)-(b). This section states:
(a) Failure of the transferor to perform a remediation and obtain department approval thereof as required pursuant to the provisions of this act is
grounds for voiding the sale or transfer of an industrial establishment or
any real property utilized in connection therewith by the transferee, entites the transferee to recover damages from the transferor, and renders
the owner or operator of the industrial establishment strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all remediation costs and for all direct or indirect
damages resulting from the failure to implement the remedial action
workplan. A transferee may not act to void the sale or transfer of an
industrial establishment or any real property except upon providing notice to the transferor of the failure to perform and affording the trans-
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ministrative Consent Order (ACO) or a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Unapproved transfers, however, will not be
penalized if the transfer occurred prior to the enactment of ISRA
and the owner enters into an ACO or MOA in order to achieve
66
compliance in a timely fashion.
On January 10, 1996, New Jersey Governor Whitman signed a
bill to encourage cleanup by industrial property owners. 16 7 The bill
encourages cleanup by providing a ten year state tax exemption if
all remedial work complies with ISRA and the site is returned to
commercial or industrial use. 168 Also, municipalities are entitled to
loans and tax exemptions for the purpose of remediation of such
property.'

69

Another "rust belt" state, Pennsylvania, has also provided a statutory response to the brownfields/greenfields dilemma in its Land
Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act
(LRERS).170 LRERS defines cleanup liability, establishes a standards scheme and remediation funding, and assigns powers and duferor a reasonable amount of time to comply with the provisions of this
act.
(b) Any person who knowingly gives or causes to be given any false information or who fails to comply with the provisions of this act is liable for a
penalty of not more than $25,000.00 for each offense. If the violation is of
a continuing nature, each day during which it continues shall constitute
an additional and separate offense. Penalties shall be collected in a civil
action by a summary proceeding .... Any officer or management official
of an industrial establishment who knowingly directs or authorizes the
violation of any provisions of this act shall be personally liable for the
penalties established in this subsection.
Id.
166. See id. § 13:1K-11.10(a). This section states in relevant part:
Any person who ... violated the [law] by closing operations or transferring ownership or operations of an industrial establishment without receiving departmental approval of a cleanup plan or negative declaration
...
or without entering into an administrative consent order that allows
the closure of operations or transfer of ownership or operations, shall not
be subject to a penalty for that violation if the person notifies the department of the closure of operations or of the transfer of ownership or operations

of the

industrial

establishment,

and . . . enters into

an

administrative consent order or a memorandum of agreement with the
department to complete a remediation of the industrial establishment
Id.
167. See New Jersey OKs Incentives to Redevelop Brownfields, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1779 (Jan. 19, 1996).
168. See id. The need for additional legislation and financial incentive may be
indicative of a weakness in enforcement under ISRA itself. If enforcement
through monetary sanctions and administrative orders was sufficiently effective,
additional legislation and incentives would not be necessary.
169. See id.
170. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.101 (West Supp. 1997).
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ties to the Environmental Quality Board and the Department of
Environmental Resources. 17 1 LRERS also establishes a state treasury fund in order to provide grants and loans. Before providing
these grants and loans, however, several factors are to be taken into
consideration. Specifically, LRERS dictates that the public benefit
served, the permanence of the remedy, the cost effectiveness of the
remedy, the financial condition of the applicant, the general geographic area, and the potential for economic development be con172
sidered in determining whether to provide a grant or a loan.
LRERS also provides that the state treasury fund receive all fines
173
and penalties imposed under the Act.
LRERS operates in conjunction with the Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act' 7 4 and the Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary
and Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act. 17 5 Provisions
of the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act define certain terms within the
statute, including but not limited to disposal, owner or operator,
responsible person and transportation.1 76 Significantly, "disposal"
171. See id.
172. See id. § 6026.702(e). This section provides:
(e) Priority for financial assistance.- The Department of Commerce
shall take all of the following factors into consideration when determining which applicants shall receive financial assistance under this section:
(1) The benefit of the remedy to public health, safety, and the
environment.
(2) The permanence of the remedy.
(3) The cost effectiveness of the remedy in comparison with other
alternatives.
(4) The financial condition of the applicant.
(5) The financial or economic distress of the area in which the
cleanup is being conducted.
(6) The potential for economic development.
The Department of Commerce shall consult with the department
when determining priorities for funding under this section.
Id.
173. See id. § 6026.701(c). This section provides in pertinent part:
In addition to any funds appropriated by the General Assembly, Federal
funds and private contributions and any fines and penalties assessed
under this act shall be deposited into the fund. Moneys in the fund are
hereby appropriated, upon the approval of the Governor, for the purposes of this act.
Id.
174. See id. § 6020.101.
175. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6027.1 (West Supp. 1997).
176. See id. § 6020.103. Transportation is defined as "[t]he conveyance of a
hazardous substance or contaminant by any mode, including pipeline." Id. For
the definitions of "disposal," "owner or operator" and "responsible person," see
infra notes 177-80.
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includes active contamination as well as leaking. 177 "Owner or operator" does not include one who holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest, or a financial institution which
acquires a site by foreclosure or enforcement of a mortgage or security interest before learning that the site was listed on the NPL or
corresponding state list and did not manage or control activities at
78
the site which contributed to the release or threat of release.'
The supervision of finances is excluded from the term "management." 179 "Responsible person" does not include a financial institution merely supervising or otherwise involved with the finances and
operations of a responsible person in connection with a loan or
obligation. 180
177. See id. "Disposal" is defined as "[t] he incarceration, combustion, evaporation, air stripping, deposition, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, mixing or
placing of a hazardous substance or contaminant into the air, water or land in a
manner which allows it to enter into the environment." Id.
178. See id. "Owner or Operator" is defined as:
A person who owns or operates or has owned or operated a site, or otherwise controlled activities at a site. The term does not include a person
who, without participating in the management of a site, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a security interest in the site nor a unit of
State or local government which acquired ownership to control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue
of its function as sovereign. The term also shall not include a financial
institution, an affiliate of a financial institution, a parent of a financial
institution, nor a corporate instrumentality of the Federal Government,
which acquired the site by foreclosure or financial institution, parent of
such financial institution, affiliate of such financial institution or a corporate instrumentality of the Federal Government before it had knowledge
that the site was included on the National Priority List or corresponding
State list and did not manage or control activities at the site which contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substances.
Id.
179. See id. The definition of "[o]wner or operator" further provides that:
For the purposes of this subsection, the term "management" shall not
include participation in or supervising the finances or fiscal operations of
a responsible person or an owner or operator in connection with a loan
to, services provided for or fiscal obligations of that responsible person or
owner or operator or actions taken to protect or preserve the value of the
site or operations conducted on the site. This exclusion does not apply to
a political subdivision which has caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the site.
Id.
180. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.103 (West Supp. 1997). The term "responsible person" is defined as follows:
A person responsible for the release of a hazardous substance as described in section 701. In no case shall a financial institution or its affiliate or a corporate instrumentality of the Federal Government be deemed
to be a responsible person or to be jointly or contingently liable for the
actions of a responsible person by virtue or supervision of, or involvement
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Section 701 of the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act provides that,
as a general rule, a person is responsible for a release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance if that person is an owner, operator, generator or transporter. 8 1 The statute also contains exceptions to liability, including an exception for subsequent purchasers.
The subsequent purchaser exception, however, may be used only if
six criteria are met.18 2 Specifically, an owner of such property must
with, the finances and operations of a responsible person in connection

with a loan, obligation, or other service provided.
Id.
181. See id. § 6020.701 (a).
(a) General rule- Except for releases of hazardous substances expressly
and specifically approved under a valid Federal or State permit, a person
shall be responsible for a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a site when any of the following apply:
(1) The person owns or operates the site:
(i) when a hazardous substance is placed or comes to be located in or on a site;
(ii) when a hazardous substance is located in or on the site, but
before it is released; or
(iii) during the time of the release or threatened release.
(2) The person generates, owns or possesses a hazardous substance
and arranges by contract, agreement, or otherwise for the disposal,
treatment or transport for disposal or treatment of the hazardous
substance.
(3) The person accepts hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person from which there is a release or a threatened release of a
hazardous substance which causes the incurrence of response costs.
Id.
182. See id. § 6020.701(b)(1). This section provides in relevant part:
(1) An owner of real property is not responsible for a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a site in or on the property when the owner demonstrates to the department that all of the following are true:
(i) The real property on which the site concerned is located was
acquired by the owner after the disposal or placement of a hazardous
substance on, in or at the site.
(ii) The owner has exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substances, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances.
(iii) The owner took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions.
(iv) The owner obtained actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at the site when the
owner owned the real property, and the owner did not subsequently
transfer ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge.
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establish that the property was acquired after disposal, that the
owner exercised due care and the owner took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party.18 3 The owner must
also demonstrate that the property was not then transferred by the
owner without disclosing knowledge of any actual or potential release, that the owner has not caused or contributed to the release
or threatened release, and that the only basis of liability is ownership of the land.1 8 4 Section 701 also includes an innocent pur18 5
chaser exception.
The Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender
Environmental Liability Protection Act provides a definition of "indicia of ownership." This definition refers to both legal and equitable interests, acquired directly or indirectly, and includes
mortgages, deeds of trust and financing transactions in which the
lessor does not control daily operation or maintenance.1 8 6 How(v) The owner has not, by act or omission, caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which is
the subject of the response action relating to the site.
(vi) The owner meets one of these requirements:
(A) At the time the owner acquired the site, the owner did not
know, and had no reason to know, that a hazardous substance
which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the site.
(B) The owner is a government entity which acquired the site
by escheat, through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition
or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by
purchase or condemnation.
(C) The owner acquired the site by inheritance or bequest.
(D) The owner is a financial institution or an affiliate of a financial institution or a corporate instrumentality of the Federal
Government which acquired the site by foreclosure or by acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 35, § 6020.701 (b) (2).
186. See id. § 6027.3. "Indicia of ownership" is defined as follows:
Any legal or equitable interest in property acquired directly or indirectly:
(1) for securing payment of a loan or indebtedness, a right of reimbursement or subrogation under a guaranty or the performance of another
obligation;
(2) evidencing ownership under a lease financing transaction where the
lessor does not initially select or ordinarily control the daily operation or
maintenance of the property; or
(3) in the course of creating, protecting, or enforcing a security interest
or right of reimbursement of subrogation under a guaranty.
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ever, those with the above described "indicia of ownership" are specifically excluded as responsible parties in the Hazardous Sites
18 7
Cleanup Act.
Ohio has enacted Senate Bill 221, a voluntary remediation stat188
ute, in an effort to effectively address the brownfields problem.
Generally, the law limits liability for lenders and those voluntarily
undertaking remediation, attempts to clarify some ambiguities
under CERCLA, and provides a remediation standard. 8 9 The Act
provides two phases of remediation which a person undertaking
remediation may select. 190 Nevertheless, both phases may not be
available for selection, depending upon the severity of contamination. In addition, a party who chooses to conduct cleanup activities
may seek a covenant not to sue from the state.191 There are two
The term includes evidence of interest in mortgages, deeds of trust, liens,
surety bonds, guaranties, lease financing transactions where the lessor
does not initially select or ordinarily control the daily operation or maintenance of the property, other forms of encumbrances against property
recognized under applicable law as vesting the holder of the security interest with some indicia of title.
Id.
187. See id. § 6020.103. For a definition of the term "responsible person" as
used in the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, see supra note 180.
188. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04 (Anderson 1997).
189. See id. § 3746.04(B)(1). This section provides that the director of environmental protection may adopt rules that establish the following:
Appropriate generic numerical clean-up standards for the treatment or
removal of soils, sediments, and water media for hazardous substances
and petroleum. The rules shall establish separate generic numerical
clean-up standards based upon the intended use of properties after the
completion of voluntary actions, including industrial, commercial, and
residential uses and such other categories of land use as the director considers to be appropriate. The generic numerical clean-up standards established for each category of land use shall be the concentration of each
contaminant that may be present on a property that shall ensure protection of public health and safety and the environment for the reasonable
exposure for that category of land use.
Id.
190. See id. § 3746.10(A). This section provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.02 of the Revised Code, any
person may undertake a voluntary action under this chapter and rules
adopted under it to identify and address potential sources of contamination by hazardous substances of soil, sediments, surface water, or ground
water on or underlying property and to establish that the property meets
applicable standards.
Id.
191. See id. § 3746.12(A). This section provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise in division (C) of this section, the director of environmental protection shall issue to a person on behalf of whom a certified
professional has submitted to the director an original no further action
letter and accompanying verification under division (A) of section
3746.11 of the Revenue Code a covenant not to sue for the property that
is named in the letter. The director shall issue a covenant not to sue if an
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noteworthy aspects of the covenant not to sue. First, the covenant's
effectiveness is contingent upon compliance with state standards.
Second, the covenant does not absolve parties from liability under
192
federal statutes.
The Ohio statute also provides a security interest exemption.
Although it mirrors the CERCLA exemption, the Ohio exemption
modifies the definitions of participation in management, indicia of
ownership primarily to protect a security interest, and owner or operator. 193 Similar to the NewJersey and Pennsylvania statutes, Ohio
also has established funds from which loans are granted to finance
private remediation. 194 Finally, the Ohio statute permits legislative
authorities to grant relief from property tax increases that result
195
from remediation in the form of tax abatements.
original no further action letter is submitted to him by any person other
than the certified professional who prepared the letter or if a copy of the
letter is submitted to him.
Id.
192. See id. § 3746.12(A)(1).
193. See OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.26(A) (1). This section provides in relevant part:
Any person who, without participating in the management of a property,
holds indicia of ownership in a property primarily to protect a security
interest in the property is not liable for:
(a) The costs of conducting a voluntary action in a civil action
brought under section 3746.23 of the Revised Code or otherwise
brought under the Revised Code or common law of this state in connection with a voluntary action undertaken at a property in which
the person holds indicia of ownership for that purpose.
Id.
194. See, e.g., id. § 6123.041. This section provides:
(A) With respect to projects, and the financing thereof, for industry,
commerce, distribution, or research.., the Ohio water development authority... may do any or all of the following:
(1) Make loans for the acquisition or construction of the project to
the person upon such terms as the authority may determine or authorize ....
Id.
195. See id. § 5709.88(D). This section provides in pertinent part:
Upon receipt and investigation of a proposal under division (C) of this
section, if the legislative authority finds that the enterprise submitting the
proposal is qualified by financial responsibility and business experience
to create and preserve the employment opportunities at the project site
and improve the economic climate of the county or municipal corporation, the legislative authority, after complying with section 5709.83 of the
Revised Code, may enter into, and formally shall approve, an agreement
with the enterprise under which the enterprise agrees to remediate a facility and to send an amount equal to at least two hundred fifty per cent
of the true value in money of the land, buildings, improvements, structures, and fixtures constituting the facility, as determined for purposes of
property taxation immediately prior to formal approval of the agreement.
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Alternatives

In addition to statutory schemes and individual agreements
with EPA, PRPs may pursue other flexible, specifically tailored options. For example, PRPs may use an arrangement whereby the
purchaser maintains a tenancy on the property and exercises a
purchase option following cleanup. 19 6 In addition, the traditional
tool of indemnification may be utilized if the seller proves to be
financially viable. 197 Finally, prospective purchasers may want to
consider a forwarding payment in order to defray cleanup costs
pursuant to a consent decree entered in federal court and to secure
a covenant not to be sued while remediation continues. 198
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fight to save brownfields and preserve greenfields,
whether for the sake of conservation, economic revitalization or
both, faces formidable opposition from inconsistencies in the interpretation of CERCLA. While these inconsistencies create confusion, the most effective response to the brownfields dilemma is
characterized by creativity and flexibility. CERCLA's inconsistency
and ambiguity must be addressed by statutory reform that works
harmoniously with state schemes.
Generally, partisan conflict concerning the method to encourage redevelopment has arisen, and consequently, the ultimate
goal of preventing migration to greenfields has not been achieved.
Although the republican sponsored proposal to amend CERCLA
contained well considered provisions, the extensive legislative delay
may result in a solution that is obsolete at the time of its enactment.
Thus, the less comprehensive democrat sponsored proposal,
though criticized as fragmented, may be more effective in achieving
revitalization since it may also be possible to encourage compromise by addressing partisan concerns individually instead of fostering disputes concerning a single comprehensive bill.
Although oversight and enforcement are most effective at the
state level, a federal umbrella is imperative to ensure predictability
and certainty regarding liability, regulation and expense. A federal
umbrella also guarantees a uniform national response to a nationally pervasive problem. At the same time, cleanup activities will not
196. See Keener, supra note 52, at 150.
197. See Madore & Breggin, supra note 62, at 69 (noting that indemnification
agreements are allowed by CERCLA but recognizing that such agreements cannot
be used to transfer liability from one person to another).
198. See Keener, supra note 52, at 150.
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be halted entirely as legislators attempt to reconcile political agendas and courts will not be faced with insurmountable volumes of
litigation.
Industrial redevelopment may also be addressed by supplementing statutory schemes with creative alternatives to attract investors to prior commercial areas while achieving remediation. Some
alternatives already explored include covenants not to sue, prospective purchaser agreements, status letters, indemnification agreements, tenancy arrangements with future purchase options and
consent decrees. These alternatives provide both flexibility, absent
from current statutes, and remediation. Admittedly, current state
statutes, federal statutes and other options do not utilize the broad
brush approach sought by some, and do not provide the flexibility
or accommodation sought by others. Therefore, neither revitalization nor remediation will be achieved as quickly as possible. However, one objective should not be forsaken for another.
The current political climate seems to dictate that more rigid
statutory provisions would be most effective overall, given the conservative eye cast upon the remediation and investment dilemmas
by the courts and legislature. This stringent framework could then
be counter-balanced by creative and acceptable supplementary provisions. Finally, state and federal funding, along with tax incentives
and noncompliance penalties, can provide incentive for investment. Overall, a balanced approach of rigid statutory provisions
and flexible alternative arrangements may allow industrial redevelopment and economic revitalization to be achieved simultaneously.
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